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This article surveys the possible application of International Criminal Law to address abuse of 
power. It thereby aims to stimulate discussion on criminal responsibility for abuse of power. 
Military commanders and civilian superiors, including politicians, can under conditions be held 
liable for abusing their power position in relation to the commitment of war crimes, crimes 
against humanity and genocide. War crimes require a state of conflict, while crimes against 
humanity and genocide can take place in both times of peace and war. Criminal forms of 
participation include committing and ordering such crimes. The abuse of a position of 
authority can be an aggravating factor in the sentencing. Even if the superior did not get 
involved in the crime directly, command responsibility can be established if the superior did 
not prevent his or her subordinates from committing the crime. It can also be established if the 
superior did not punish these subordinates for committing the crime. Criteria include that the 
commander or superior had effective control over his or her subordinates, whether on a legal 
basis or in fact, and knew or had reason to know that they were committing or about to 
commit such crimes. Therefore, people who abuse their position to, for example, cause or 
maintain a conflict situation at the cost of the human security of population groups, could find 
themselves accused of having committed international crimes. 
 
During my research and interviews in conflict areas in Asia [1], again and again a pattern of 
abuse of power to safeguard interests at the cost of people at grassroots level appeared. One 
interviewee from the Philippines, who witnessed the emotions of both military and rebels, said 
that the war that took place seemed like a game played by ambitious men. Interviews in other 
countries also referred to interests of people far away from the conflict area and personally 
unaffected by the consequences of armed conflict. Interests in natural resources such as gas 
and wood were referred to as root causes to the conflict. 
Based on reoccurring patterns, including those in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, it 
can be argued that (armed) conflicts at grassroots level often serve certain interests of people in 
power positions. Such conflicts can threaten the security of large groups of the population. 
International criminal tribunals focus their efforts on people in high positions as the people 
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with the greatest responsibility for the conflict. In its Policy Paper, the Office of the 
Prosecutor at the International Criminal Court states [2]: 
 
The Office will function with a two-tiered approach to combat impunity. On the one 
hand it will initiate prosecutions of the leaders who bear most responsibility for the 
crimes. On the other hand it will encourage national prosecutions, where possible, for 
the lower-ranking perpetrators, or work with the international community to ensure 
that the offenders are brought to justice by some other means. 
 
This paper surveys the possible application of International Criminal Law to address abuse 
of power. It thereby aims to stimulate discussion on criminal responsibility for abuse of power. 
First, underlying interests in conflicts are touched upon. Second, international criminal law is 
introduced. Third, international crimes are elaborated upon. Fourth, individual criminal 
responsibility is discussed with a focus on command or superior responsibility. 
 Interests in conflict 
Taking a look at the world map, there is a striking overlap between the location of natural 
resources, conflicts and human rights violations. The presence of big (international) companies 
is also noticeable in these areas. Our current consumption patterns result in transport of 
resources and products all over the world. The huge amount of trade and finances involved 
increase the stake for multinationals in access to resources and interests of States in 
exploitation of resources for export. Another big business at a global scale is the weapon 
industry, entailing high financial interests in (potential) conflict. 
As an example, part of the conflict in Aceh concerns the wish for independence, often 
related to the call for an Islamic state. This fuels the fear of many Indonesians to loose 
(another) part of the country’s territory. However, the main interests behind the conflict seem 
to be economic interests in natural resources such as gas and wood, influencing politics and 
social aspects. A comparative analysis on the atrocities against women of Aceh, East-Timor, 
Papua, and Jakarta reveals many similarities in the violence. Another reoccurring pattern 
appears to entail the soothing of a population by, for example, taking measures that underline 
their identity in response to unrest. For example, Islamic law might be granted to a certain 
extent, such as relating to the use of alcohol, but at the same time human rights and control 
over resources may be withheld. Similarly, in distracting the attention of people, measures 
claimed to be based on Christian values may actually serve expansion of access to resources. [3] 
Raising or maintaining conflict, both abroad and internal, can form a distraction from 
other issues and interests. As stated by one of the interviewees, during a status of red alert 
another year of Martial Law can easily be provoked. When it was voiced that it was time to end 
the military status in this region, ‘suddenly’ a big accident happened that provided the 
authorities with an excuse to extend the military regime. In this case, the military interest was 
directly connected to the presence of an international oil company, which had to pay a high 
price for their security considering the conflict. In addition, it is noticeable that when peace is 
established in one conflict area, often escalation takes place in another area. 
 The diversity in society – ethnic, religious and cultural – is regularly abused to 
provoke hatred between population groups. To start or maintain an armed conflict, use of the 
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‘divide-and-rule’ strategy appears to have remained popular. By dividing the population, for 
example, (over-)exploitation of resources and confiscation of land can take place without too 
much consequence. Historical and present misunderstandings enable such strategies. Cases 
include situations in which members of one ethnic group were killed while rumours were 
spread that another ethnic group is responsible. Research also reveals a pattern in which, just 
before armed conflict takes place, groups of outsiders enter the area to stimulate polarisation 
and disturb existing good relations. For example, in the Philippines (Christian) militias 
instigated by outsiders attacked the Moro (Muslim) population at the start of the armed 
conflict in Mindanao in 1972. Minorities can serve as scapegoats, such as the Chinese 
population in Indonesia, who were the main victim of the 1998 Jakarta rapes during the 
downfall of Soeharto. The conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda played the ethnic 
card. According to the Vasiljevic Trial Judgment: ‘During the Bosnian conflict, ethnicity has 
variedly been exploited to gain political prominence or to retain power, to justify criminal 
deeds, or for the purpose of obtaining moral absolution for any act coloured by the ethnic 
cause’ [4]. 
International Criminal Law 
International Criminal Law (ICL) is part of international public law [5]. International 
humanitarian law that has become part of customary international law includes the law 
embodied in the Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land 
and the Regulations annexed thereto of 18 October 1907; the Charter of the International 
Military Tribunal of 8 august 1945; the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide of 9 December 1948; and the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for 
the Protection of War Victims. 
Historically, humanitarian law would address the law of war between States. The laws and 
customs of war entailed a code of military conduct between combatant States. However, a shift 
has taken place toward a humanitarian-oriented view. On the state-oriented and human-
oriented approaches Sands states (although not on the law of war as such) [6]:  
 
The judgement of the House of Lords (a national court) in Pinochet and of the ICJ in 
Yerodia reflect, in my opinion, a struggle between two competing visions of 
international law. For the majority in the House of Lords, international law is treated 
as a set of rules the primary purpose of which is to give effect to a set of broadly 
shared values, including a commitment to rooting out impunity for the gravest 
international crimes. The other vision, that reflected in the judgement of the ICJ, sees 
the rules of international law as being intended principally to facilitate relations 
between states, which remain the principal international actors. 
 
The international criminal tribunals seem to be more in line with the focus on ‘rooting out 
impunity for the gravest international crimes’. The Charters and trials of the International 
Military Tribunals in Nuremberg and Tokyo following the end of World War II lay the 
foundation of individual responsibility under international law, referring to crimes against 
peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity [7]. According to the IMT in Nuremberg: 
‘Crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by 
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punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be 
enforced’ [8]. 
Between the end of World War II and the 1990s, the establishment of an international 
criminal tribunal was often regarded as unrealistic. In 1993, the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was established under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, as a 
measure to maintain and restore international peace and security, and based on a UN Security 
Council Resolution [9]. In 1994, the UNSC adopted a resolution to establish the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) [10]. The ICTY and ICTR have turned dormant 
humanitarian law into a practical and speedily developing body of law. 
Contrary to the ICTY and ICTR, the International Criminal Court (ICC) is a permanent 
court and established by treaty: the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court that 
entered into force on 1 July 2002 and to which currently 108 countries are States Parties [11]. 
Another difference between the ICC and the ad hoc Tribunals can be found in Article 17 of the 
Rome Statute, which provides that it will only take up cases not (adequately) dealt with by 
national courts. The ICC has unsealed its first warrants in October 2005. The first person was 
surrendered to the Court in March 2006: Mr. Lubanga, a former leader of a militia group in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, who has been charged with enlisting and conscripting 
children under the age of 15 and using them to participate actively in hostilities. 'The ICC 
continues its investigations of the situations in Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, 
Central African Republic and Darfur, the Sudan [12].  
Internationalised criminal courts were also established for Sierra Leone, East Timor, 
Kosovo and Cambodia [13]. As stated by the ICC: ‘The Court and the United Nations are each 
part of an emerging system of international criminal justice. Within that system, the staff and 
officials of the different courts and tribunals regularly meet to share lessons from their 
experiences’ [14]. With the coming into existence of the tribunals, ICL has become a far more 
realistic instrument to address international crimes and to prosecute the people responsible. As 
formulated by Mettraux, the following purposes of sentencing individuals for international 
crimes can be identified from the jurisprudence of the ICTY and ICTR [15]:  
 
(i) retribution, described as punishment of an offender for his specific criminal 
conduct; and (ii) general deterrence, understood as deterrence of future violations of 
international humanitarian law. In addition to the two principal purposes of 
sentencing mentioned above, a number of Chambers of the Tribunals have insisted 
that a sentence should also serve other purposes such as ‘individual and affirmative 
prosecution aimed at influencing the legal awareness of the accused, the victims, the 
relatives, the witnesses, and the general public in order to reassure them that the legal 
system is being implemented and enforced’, the ‘protection of society, stigmatisation 
and public reprobation of international crimes’, the ‘rehabilitation’ of the perpetrator, 
or even ‘reconciliation’. 
 
The law that tribunals can apply depends on both international law and on their Statute. 
For example, crimes against humanity do not as such require a state of armed conflict, but the 
Statute adds this requirement for the ICTY. On the applicable law, Article 21 of the Rome 
Statute for the ICC states: 
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1. The Court shall apply: 
(a) In the first place, this Statute, Elements of Crimes and its Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence; 
(b) In the second place, where appropriate, applicable treaties and the principles and 
rules of international law, including the established principles of the international law 
of armed conflict; 
(c) Failing that, general principles of law derived by the Court from national laws of 
legal systems of the world including, as appropriate, the national laws of States that 
would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime, provided that those principles are 
not inconsistent with this Statute and with international law and internationally 
recognised norms and standards. 
2. The Court may apply principles and rules of law as interpreted in its previous 
decisions. 
3. The application and interpretation of law pursuant to this article must be consistent 
with internationally recognised human rights, and be without any adverse distinction 
founded on grounds such as gender as defined in article 7, paragraph 3, age, race, 
colour, language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social 
origin, wealth, birth or other status. 
 
According to Kor: ‘[A]s it stands now, we must not see ICL as an autonomous and closed 
‘system’ but as a ‘multipolar space’, open to interactions between general international law and 
international human rights law, and between international and national sources’ [16]. 
International crimes 
International crimes under ICL include war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. A 
shift toward a humanitarian approach also explains the currently fading difference between the 
applicable law, and the international crimes it entails, relating to international and internal 
conflicts. On the distinction between international and internal armed conflicts, the Tadić 
Appeal Chamber stated: ‘that in the area of armed conflict the distinction between interstate 
wars and civil wars is losing its value’ and ‘if international law, while of course duly 
safeguarding the legitimate interests of States, must gradually turn to the protection of human 
beings, it is only natural that the aforementioned dichotomy should gradually lose its weight’ 
[17]. For now, the distinction between international and internal armed conflict to a certain 
extent remains to determine the applicable body of law. ‘Grave breaches’ of the Geneva 
Conventions require the involvement of the armed forces of two states in combat, even if only 
on the territory of one state or with minimum intensity. These and other war crimes will be 
discussed first. 
War crimes 
War crimes are serious violations of the laws or customs of war. War crimes can only take 
place during a state of conflict. To constitute a war crime, a crime must have been closely 
related to the hostilities. War crimes can be committed by and against civilians and military. 
Originally, war crimes could not be committed against a state’s own nationals. The Tadić 
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Appeals Chamber stated that actual allegiance and ethnicity can be determinative of 
‘nationality’ for the purpose of the grave breaches regime of the Geneva Conventions, more so 
than formal bonds such as a passport [18].  
War crimes include ‘grave breaches’ of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which require an 
international armed conflict and are limited to certain categories of protected persons and 
properties. Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions as laid down in Article 2 ICTY Statute 
are: wilful killing; torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments; wilfully 
causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health; extensive destruction and 
appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and 
wantonly; compelling a prisoner of war or a civilian to serve in the forces of a hostile power; 
wilfully depriving a prisoner of war or a civilian of the rights of fair and regular trial; unlawful 
deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a civilian; and taking civilians as hostages. 
Other serious violations of the laws or customs of war as laid down in Article 3 ICTY 
Statute include, but are not limited to: employment of poisonous weapons or other weapons 
calculated to cause unnecessary suffering; wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or 
devastation not justified by military necessity; attack, or bombardment, by whatever means, of 
undefended towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings; seizure of, destruction or willful damage 
done to institutions dedicated to religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences, historic 
monuments and works of art and science; plunder of public or private property. 
Crimes against humanity 
Crimes against humanity can be committed both in times of war and peace. Crimes against 
humanity refer to inhumane acts such as wilful killing, torture or rape, committed as part of a 
widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population. These crimes can only be 
committed against civilians. 
Crimes against humanity chapeau elements are: 1. an attack (commission of acts of 
violence); 2. nexus between acts and attack; 3. the attack is directed against any civilian 
population; 4. the attack is widespread or systematic; 5. the perpetrator must know that his acts 
are part of an attack on the civilian population. Crimes against humanity as laid down in Article 
5 of the ICTY Statute and Article 3 of the ICTR Statute are: murder; extermination; enslavement; 
deportation; imprisonment; torture; rape; persecutions on political, racial and religious ground; 
and other inhumane acts. 
Genocide 
The crime of genocide mainly resulted from the atrocities of World War II. This crime does 
not require a state of conflict. Genocide can be committed by and against civilians and military. 
Genocide contains acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, 
ethnical, racial or religious group, e.g. by killing members of the group and forcibly transferring 
children of the group to another group.  
The chapeau elements of genocide are: 1. intent; 2. to destroy; 3. in whole or in part; 4. a 
protected group; 5. as such. Genocide requires a special or genocidal intent to destroy a 
protected group in whole or in part. Underlying offences are: killing members of the group; 
causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the 
group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; 
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imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; forcibly transferring children 
of the group to another group. Criminal participation in genocide refers to: committing 
genocide; conspiracy to commit genocide; direct and public incitement to commit genocide; 
attempt to commit genocide; complicity in genocide. 
Individual criminal responsibility 
The crimes as laid out above entail individual responsibility. Article 7 ICTY Statute on 
individual criminal responsibility, similar to Article 6 ICTR Statute, states [19]:  
 
1. A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and 
abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in articles 2 to 
5 of the present Statute, shall be individually responsible for the crime. 
2. The official position of any accused person, whether as Head of State or 
Government or as a responsible Government official, shall not relieve such person of 
criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment. 
3. The fact that any of the acts referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute 
was committed by a subordinate does not relieve his superior of criminal 
responsibility if he knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to 
commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the necessary and 
reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof. 
4. The fact that an accused person acted pursuant to an order of a Government or 
of a superior shall not relieve him of criminal responsibility, but may be considered in 
mitigation of punishment if the International Tribunal determines that justice so 
requires. 
 
The reference to Articles 2-5 concerns: grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 
1949 (Article 2), violations of the laws or customs of war (Article 3), genocide (Article 4), and 
crimes against humanity (Article 5). 
Forms of participation 
Article 7(1) ICTY Statute entails the various forms of participation. For example, publications 
that encourage ICL crimes can under circumstances result in instigation. The ICTR in the 
Nahimana Trial Judgment states [20]: 
 
977A. As founder, owner and editor of Kangura, a publication that instigated the 
killing of Tutsi civilians, and for his individual acts in ordering and aiding and abetting 
the killing of Tutsi civilians, the Chamber finds Hassan Ngeze guilty of genocide, 
pursuant to Article 6(1) of its Statute. 
 
The various forms of participation included in Article 6(1) ICTR Statute are explained in 
the Semanza Trial Judgement as follows [21]:  
 
(i) Planning 
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380. “Planning” envisions one or more persons formulating a method of design or 
action, procedure, or arrangement for the accomplishment of a particular crime. The 
level of participation in the planning must be substantial such as actually formulating 
the criminal plan or endorsing a plan proposed by another. 
(ii)  Instigating 
381. “Instigating” refers to urging, encouraging, or prompting another person to 
commit a crime. Instigation need not be direct and public. Proof is required of a 
causal connection between the instigation and the commission of the crime. 
(iii) Ordering 
382. “Ordering” refers to a situation where an individual has a position of authority 
and uses that authority to order – and thus compel – another individual, who is 
subject to that authority, to commit a crime. Criminal responsibility for ordering the 
commission of a crime under the Statute implies the existence of a superior-
subordinate relationship between the individual who gives the order and the one who 
executes it.  
(iv) Committing 
383. “Committing” refers to the direct personal or physical participation of an 
accused in the actual acts which constitute the material elements of a crime under the 
Statute. 
(v) Aiding and Abetting in the Planning, Preparation, or Execution 
384. The terms “aiding” and “abetting” refer to distinct legal concepts. The term 
“aiding” means assisting or helping another to commit a crime, and the term 
“abetting” means encouraging, advising, or instigating the commission of a crime. 
However, the terms “aiding” and “abetting” are frequently employed together as a 
single broad legal concept, as is the case in this Tribunal. 
Command responsibility 
People in power positions often do not personally commit the crimes but enable or allow 
others to commit them. Command responsibility as formulated in Article 7(3) ICTY Statute can 
under conditions address their (lack of) actions in such cases. The shared Appeals Chamber of 
the ICTY and ICTR states on command responsibility [22]:  
 
Thus, whether Article 3 of the Statute is referring to war crimes committed in the 
course of international armed conflict or to war crimes committed in the course of 
internal armed conflict under Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions, it 
assumes that there is an organized military force. It is evident that there cannot be an 
organized military force save on the basis of responsible command. It is also 
reasonable to hold that it is responsible command which leads to command 
responsibility. Command responsibility is the most effective method by which 
international criminal law can enforce responsible command.  
 
Criminal responsibility of a superior or commander relates to his/her own acts or failures 
to act to prevent or punish the acts of others. The criteria for establishing command 
responsibility are summarised by Mettraux as follows [23]:  
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(i) the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the commander or 
superior and the alleged principal offenders; 
(ii) the superior knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to 
commit such acts or had done so; and 
(iii) the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such 
acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof. 
 
Jurisprudence reaffirms that command responsibility can be established for both military 
and civil superiors, including politicians. In the Čelebići case, the Appeals Chamber elaborated 
on the application of command responsibility to civilian superiors, and reaffirmed that such 
responsibility can relate to both de jure and de facto command or control [24].  
 
195. The Trial Chamber, prior to making this statement in relation to the case of 
Mucic, had already considered the origin and meaning of de facto authority with 
reference to existing practice. Based on an analysis of World War II jurisprudence, 
the Trial Chamber also concluded that the principle of superior responsibility 
reflected in Article 7(3) of the Statute encompasses political leaders and other civilian 
superiors in positions of authority. The Appeals Chamber finds no reason to disagree 
with the Trial Chamber’s analysis of this jurisprudence. The principle that military and 
other superiors may be held criminally responsible for the acts of their subordinates is 
well-established in conventional and customary law. The standard of control reflected 
in Article 87(3) of Additional Protocol I [to the 1949 Geneva Conventions] may be 
considered as customary in nature. In relying upon the wording of Articles 86 and 87 
of Additional Protocol I to conclude that “it is clear that the term ‘superior’ is 
sufficiently broad to encompass a position of authority based on the existence of de 
facto powers of control”, the Trial Chamber properly considered the issue in finding 
the applicable law.  
 
196. “Command”, a term which does not seem to present particular controversy in 
interpretation, normally means powers that attach to a military superior, whilst the 
term “control”, which has a wider meaning, may encompass powers wielded by 
civilian leaders. In this respect, the Appeals Chamber does not consider that the rule 
is controversial that civilian leaders may incur responsibility in relation to acts 
committed by their subordinates or other persons under their effective control. 
Effective control has been accepted, including in the jurisprudence of the Tribunal, as 
a standard for the purposes of determining superior responsibility. The Blaskic Trial 
Chamber for instance endorsed the finding of the Trial Judgement to this effect. The 
showing of effective control is required in cases involving both de jure and de facto 
superiors. This standard has more recently been reaffirmed in the ICC Statute, Article 
28 of which reads in relevant parts:  
 
In addition to other grounds of criminal responsibility under this Statute for crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the Court;  
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(a) A military commander or person effectively acting as a military commander shall 
be criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court committed by 
forces under his or her effective command and control, or effective authority and 
control as the case may be, as a result of his or her failure to exercise control properly 
over such forces, . . .  
(b) With respect to superior and subordinate relationships not described in paragraph 
(a), a superior shall be criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
Court committed by subordinates under his or her effective authority and control, as 
a result of his or her failure to exercise control properly over such subordinates . . . 
 
Therefore, command or superior responsibility requires establishment of effective (de jure 
or de facto) control of a (military or civilian) superior to prevent and/or punish a war crime, 
crime against humanity or genocide (to be) committed by subordinates. 
While effective control may be presumed in case of de jure control, the ability to exercise 
effective control is required for the establishment of de facto command or superior 
responsibility [25]. Command responsibility can be established for more than one person, as 
stated in the Krnojelac Trial Judgment [26]:  
 
Effective control means the material ability to prevent offences or punish the 
principal offenders. Where a superior has effective control and fails to exercise that 
power he will be responsible for the crimes committed by his subordinates. Two or 
more superiors may be held responsible for the same crime perpetrated by the same 
individual if it is established that the principal offender was under the command of 
both superiors at the relevant time. 
 
On superior responsibility relating to a leader of a political party, the ICTR in the Nahimana 
Trial Judgment states [27]: 
 
976. The Chamber notes that in Musema, the Tribunal found that superior 
responsibility extended to non-military settings, in that case to the owner of a tea 
factory. The Chamber has considered the extent to which Barayagwiza, as leader of the 
CDR, a political party, can be held responsible pursuant to Article 6(3) of its Statute 
for acts committed by CDR party members and Impuzamugambi. The Chamber 
recognizes that a political party and its leadership cannot be held accountable for all 
acts committed by party members or others affiliated to the party. A political party is 
unlike a government, military or corporate structure in that its members are not 
bound through professional affiliation or in an employment capacity to be governed 
by the decision-making body of the party. Nevertheless, the Chamber considers that 
to the extent that members of a political party act in accordance with the dictates or 
instruction of that party, or otherwise under its instruction, those issuing such dictates 
or instruction can and should be held accountable for their implementation. In this 
case, CDR party members and Impuzamugambi were following the lead of the party, and 
of Barayagwiza himself, who was at meetings, at demonstrations, and at road-blocks, 
where CDR members and Impuzqmugambi were marshalled into action by party 
officials, including Barayagwiza or under his authority as leader of the party. In these 
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circumstances, the Chamber holds that Barayagwiza was responsible for the activities 
of CDR members and Impuzamugambi, to the extent that such activities were initiated 
by or undertaken in accordance with his direction as leader of the CDR party. 
 
977. The Chamber finds that Barayagwiza had superior responsibility over members of 
the CDR and its militia, the Impuzamugambi, as President of CDR at Gisenyi Prefecture 
and from February 1994 as President of CDR at the national level. He promoted the 
policy of CDR for the extermination of the Tutsi population and supervised his 
subordinates, the CDR members and Impuzamugambi militia, in carrying out the killings 
and other violent acts. For his active engagement in CDR, and his failure to take 
necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the killing of Tutsi civilians by CDR 
members and Impuzamugambi, the Chamber finds Barayagwiza guilty of genocide 
pursuant to Article 6(3) of its Statute. 
 
That a superior ‘knew’ or ‘had reason to know’ needs to be established beyond reasonable 
doubt. The Čelebići Appeal Judgment refers to the Trial Chamber’s statement in stating that a 
superior [28]:  
 
may possess the mens rea for command responsibility where: (1) he had actual 
knowledge, established through direct or circumstantial evidence, that his 
subordinates were committing or about to commit crimes referred to under Articles 2 
through 5 of the Statute, or (2) where he had in his possession information of a 
nature, which at the least, would put him on notice of the risk of such offences by 
indicating the need for additional investigation in order to ascertain whether such 
crimes were committed or were about to be committed by his subordinates.  
 
Indicators of such knowledge include the number and type of troops allegedly involved 
and the nature and scope of the responsibility of the accused and his position in the hierarchy 
[29]. Punishment by the superior of his or her subordinates does not obsolete the duty to 
prevent their acts; the requirements to prevent and punish are cumulative. 
The abuse of a position of authority can also constitute an aggravating circumstance in 
sentencing. According to Mettraux: ‘An individual will not be sentenced more harshly simply 
because he finds himself higher up in the hierarchy, but his sentence may be aggravated if he 
has abused or wrongly exercised the powers and responsibilities placed upon him for the 
purpose of committing or facilitating crimes’ [30]. In case an accused has been found guilty for 
both taking part in the commission of a crime and for failing to prevent the acts or punish the 
perpetrators, the Blaškić Appeal Judgment stated that the conviction will be based on the 
commitment of the crime while considering the superior position of the accused as an 
aggravating factor in sentencing [31]. 
Conclusion 
Military commanders and civilian superiors, including politicians, can under conditions be held 
liable for abusing their power position in relation to the commitment of war crimes, crimes 
against humanity and genocide. War crimes require a state of conflict, while crimes against 
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humanity and genocide can take place in both times of peace and war. Criminal forms of 
participation include committing and ordering such crimes. The abuse of a position of 
authority can be an aggravating factor in the sentencing. Even if the superior did not get 
involved in the crime directly, command responsibility can be established if the superior did 
not prevent his or her subordinates from committing the crime. It can also be established if the 
superior did not punish these subordinates for committing the crime. Criteria include that the 
commander or superior had effective control over his or her subordinates, whether on a legal 
basis or in fact, and knew or had reason to know that they were committing or about to 
commit such crimes. Command responsibility may be hard to prove, although the 
jurisprudence of the ICTY and ICTR has shown that the judges will not be easily distracted by 
legalities such as a de jure command or control. 
Therefore, people who abuse their position to, for example, cause or maintain a conflict 
situation at the cost of the human security of population groups, could find themselves 
accused of having committed international crimes. For example, abusing ones power position 
to order or allow people to be tortured, disappeared or killed during an armed conflict is likely 
to constitute a war crime. Instigating the prosecution of members of a certain population 
group as part of a widespread or systematic attack to safeguard land interests could very well 
constitute a crime against humanity. 
Considering the development of ICL and the more than one hundred States Parties to the 
ICC, international criminal responsibility has become a suitable instrument to address and 
discourage certain forms of abuse of power, which can include power abused to serve interests 
such as in natural resources. The cooperation of States and international organisations is e.g. 
needed to arrest and transfer accused to international criminal tribunals, and to enable the 
gathering of evidence. Prosecution of crimes is one of many instruments to address injustice 
and human insecurity. The media and academic writing can, for example, assist in increasingly 
providing people with information that exposes the root causes of conflict and international 
crimes. In addition, positive measures such as peace-building efforts undertaken at the 
grassroots level can contribute to an environment in which people are less vulnerable to 
manipulation. 
Notes 
 
1. The interviews were undertaken on behalf of a network of development organisations and 
related to the work of peace-builders in conflict areas. 
2. ICC, Paper on some policy issues before the Office of the Prosecutor, September 2003, p. 
3. 
3. In addition to general literature on conflict and natural resources, such patterns were 
pointed out and confirmed during confidential research undertaken in 2005-2006. 
4. ICTY, Vasiljevic Trial Judgment, 29 November 2002, par. 278. 
5. See on International Criminal Law: G. Mettraux, International Crimes and the Ad Hoc 
Tribunals, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005; A. Cassese, International Criminal 
Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003; A. Cassese, P. Gaeta and J.R.W.D. Jones 
(Eds.), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2002; L.C. Green, The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict, Manchester 
 International criminal responsibility for abuse of power?              27 
 
 
 
University Press, Manchester, 2000; V. Morris and M.P. Scharf, The International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 1998; and R.S. Clark and M. Sann (Eds.), The Prosecution 
of International Crimes: A Critical Study of the International Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, 1996. 
6. P. Sands, ‘After Pinochet: the role of international courts, in: P. Sands (Ed.), From 
Nuremberg to The Hague: The Future of International Criminal Justice, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2003, p. 103. 
7. On the Tokyo tribunal, see B.V.A. Röling and A. Cassese, The Tokyo Trial and Beyond, 
Polity Press, Cambridge, 1993. 
8. IMT, judgment of 1 October 1946, in The Trial of German Major War Criminals: 
Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal Sitting at Nuremberg, Germany, part 
22, p. 447. 
9. UN Doc. S/RES/808 (22 February 1993). See ICTY website: http://www.un.org/icty. 
10. UN Doc. S/RES/955 (8 November 1994). See ICTR website: http://www.un.org/ictr. 
11. See http://www.icc-cpi.int. See also A. Cassese, P. Gaeta and J.R.W.D. Jones (Eds.) The 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Vol. 2, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2002; P. Saland, Chapter Seven, in: R.S. Lee (Ed.) The International Criminal 
Court: The Making of the Rome Statute, Kluwer Law International, 1999. 
12. See http://www.icc-cpi.int. ICC, Report of the International Criminal Court for 2005-
2006, 3 August 2006, UN Doc. A/61/217. 
13. See Romano, Nollkaemper and Kleffner (Eds.), Internationalized Criminal Courts, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004. See also, for example, http://www.sc-sl.org: An 
agreement to establish the Special Court for Sierra Leone was signed by the UN and the 
Government of Sierra Leone on 16 January 2002. The Sierra Leone Court: ‘It is mandated 
to try those who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international 
humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since 
30 November 1996.’ Indictments include charges of war crimes, crimes against humanity, 
and other serious violations of international humanitarian law. ‘Specifically, the charges 
include murder, rape, extermination, acts of terror, enslavement, looting and burning, 
sexual slavery, conscription of children into an armed force, and attacks on United 
Nations peacekeepers and humanitarian workers, among others.’ 
14. See [13]. 
15. Mettraux (see [5]), pp. 345-346. 
16. G. Kor (2006), discussion paper, part of his PhD research at the VU. 
17. ICTY, Tadić Jurisdiction Decision, 2 October 1995, par. 97. 
18. ICTY, Tadić Appeal Judgment, pars 164-166. 
19. See for an analysis of this Article e.g. Mettraux (see [5]), Chapters 20, 21 and 22. 
20. ICTR, Nahimana Trial Judgment, 3 December 2003. 
21. ICTR, Semanza Trial Judgement, 15 May 2003. 
22. ICTY, Hadžihasanović Decision of 16 July 2003 on Interlocutory Appeal Challenging 
Jurisdiction in Relation to Command Responsibility, par. 16.  
23. Mettraux (see [5]), p. 298. 
24. ICTY, Čelebići Appeal Judgment of 20 February 2001. See also ICTR Kayishema and 
Ruzindana Trial Judgment of 21 May 1999. 
28 ISYP Journal on Science and World Affairs, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2007  
 
 
 
25. ICTY, Čelebići Appeal Judgment of 20 February 2001. See also, e.g., ICTR Kayishema and 
Ruzindana Trial Judgment of 21 May 1999, par. 197. 
26. ICTY, Krnojelac Trial Judgment of 15 March 2002, par. 93. 
27. See [20]. 
28. ICTY, Čelebići Appeal Judgment, par. 223. 
29. See Mettraux (see [5]), pp. 301-306 on the knowledge requirement. 
30. Mettraux (see [5]), pp. 353-354. 
31. ICTY, Blaškić Appeal Judgment of 29 July 2004, par 91. 
